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NOTES
Judicial Review Gone Awry: The Supreme Court Rewrites the
NLRB's Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales & Service,
Inc v. NLRB
The rise of the administrative state has produced considerable
tension between the federal judiciary, whose duty it is to interpret the
law, and the administrative agencies charged with interpreting and
applying the various statutes under which they operate.' Much of this
tension results from the ability of agencies to perform both quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Agencies can pass regulations
with the binding force of statutes, and they can adjudicate disputes
arising under statutes and their rules. Over the past several decades,
the U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated several principles establishing
a policy of judicial deference toward agency actions taken pursuant to
statutory mandate.' For instance, the Seminole Rock principle
1. Many commentators have viewed administrative agencies as a threat to separation
of powers. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 514-16, 525-26 (1989) (arguing that
judicial deference to administrative agencies undermines the separation of powers in favor
of the executive branch); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHn. L. REv. 123, 182-84 (1994) (same). For a contrary view, see 1
KENNETH GULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADI~NIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE
§ 2.1, at 107-08 (1994) (arguing that many of those who criticize the constitutionality of
administrative agencies on separation of powers grounds misinterpret the Constitution to
forbid the reallocation or blending of powers between or among branches of government).
2. See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 7-8, at 287-401 (describing the
legislative and adjudicatory functions conducted by administrative agencies).
3. The Court announced its most famous example of this deference in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Prior to
Chevron, the judiciary lacked any consistent theoretical approach to the review of agency
actions. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 87-94
(1994). Indeed, the Supreme Court paid great deference to agency actions in some cases
while substituting its own judgment for agency decisions in others. See 1 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 107-09.
Chevron filled this vacuum with a two-step test for courts to apply to the
interpretations that agencies give to the statutes they administer. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43. The first step is a "plain meaning" test: A court reviewing an agency's
interpretation must ask whether the statute directly and unambiguously addresses the
precise question at issue. See id. If the answer is yes, then no deference should be given to
the agency's interpretation, since both the court and the agency must give effect to "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. The second step, which is reached only
if "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," requires a court to
1926 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77
dictates that federal courts give "substantial deference" to an
administrative agency's interpretation of a rule promulgated pursuant
to statute.' At odds with this principle is the lower courts' willingness
to review and overturn agency actions they deem inconsistent with an
agency's preexisting rules.- Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
ask whether an agency's statutory interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of
the statute." Id. at 843. If the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute, Chevron dictates that a court defer to it. See id. A construction is permissible if it
is "reasonable." Id. at 845.
The lower courts have observed the deference mandated by Chevron with "unusual
consistency." Seidenfeld, supra, at 94. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has slowly
decreased the amount of Chevron deference that it affords agency interpretations of
statutes, invalidating a growing number of agency interpretations by finding them at
variance with the "plain meaning" of statutes. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 351-54 (1994); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 750 (1995).
Chevron has been the subject of criticism from a host of commentators. See, e.g.,
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
377 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 998 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?,
36 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1986).
4. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). The
Seminole Rock principle is similar to Chevron. Whereas Chevron mandates that courts in
most cases defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, Seminole Rock
requires courts to defer in most cases to an agency's interpretation of a rule it promulgates
pursuant to statute:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must
necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the
meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the
principles of the Constitution... may be relevant in the first instance in choosing
between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation, which becomes controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.
Id. Courts have applied this principle in numerous cases to uphold agencies'
interpretations of their own rules and regulations. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1995) (upholding the refusal of the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HSS") to reimburse a hospital for costs it calculated by generally
accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), even though HHS had previously issued rules
arguably requiring hospitals to follow GAAP); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (upholding HHS's refusal to reimburse a hospital for certain
educational costs based on the agency's interpretation of the relevant regulation).
Unlike Chevron's two-step test, the legitimacy of the Seminole Rock principle has
rarely been called into question by either the courts or academia. See 1 DAvIS & PIERCE,
supra note 1, § 6.10, at 281-82 (noting that courts continue to espouse the Seminole Rock
principle); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 614 (1996) (stating that the
Seminole Rock principle "has long been one of the least worried-about principles of
administrative law"). Manning, however, is the exception, arguing that the Court "should
replace Seminole Rock with a standard that imposes an independent judicial check on the
agency's determination of regulatory meaning." Manning, supra, at 617.
5. See generally Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with
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itself at times seemingly departed from the deference it espouses.6
This discrepancy between principle and practice was evident
recently in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB,7 a case in
which the Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") clashed over the Board's interpretation of its
standard for employer polling of union support.' The Board currently
permits an employer to poll its employees to determine the existing
level of union support only if the employer has an "objective
reasonable doubt" about the union's majority status.9 The Board
applies this standard, also called the good faith reasonable doubt
standard'0 or the unitary standard," to Representation Management
("RM") elections" and employer withdrawals of union recognition. 3
Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1187 (1997) (demonstrating the
courts' willingness to upset agency actions where those actions deviate from preexisting
agency policies). Krent notes that the courts are typically reluctant to second-guess
administrative decisions when "judicially administrable standards" are lacking. Id. at
1187. This reluctance is evidenced by several doctrines governing judicial review of
administrative actions. See id. at 1187-88. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
an agency's nonenforcement is presumptively unreviewable because nonenforcement
"'often involves a complicated balancing of ... factors which are peculiarly within [the
agency's] expertise.'" Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
Although reluctant to intervene when judicially administrable standards are difficult
to find, courts frequently reassert their authority to monitor agency actions where such
standards can be divined. See id. at 1188. Thus, courts do not hesitate to review an
agency's nonenforcement where a challenger asserts that the nonenforcement is
inconsistent with an agency rule. See id.
6. See infra notes 61-68, 92-102 and accompanying text.
7. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
8. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. Congress created the NLRB in 1935
to settle union representation questions and to prosecute unfair labor practices. See
LEROY S. MERRIFIELD ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS 29
(1994). See generally infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (reviewing the passage of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and the creation of the NLRB).
9. The Board first applied the objective reasonable doubt test to polling in
Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (1974). See infra notes 181-86 and
accompanying text (discussing Montgomery Ward & Co.). "Majority status" does not
necessarily mean that a union must be supported by a majority of all an employer's
employees. Rather, a union has majority status if it is supported by a majority of
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). The
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act") invests the Board with the power
to decide whether a bargaining unit in a particular case is appropriate. See id. § 159(b);
MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 8, at 241. Over the years, the Board has formulated
certain criteria for determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit. See MERRIFIELD
ET AL., supra note 8, at 241. The most important criterion is mutuality of interest, which
requires that "'employees with similar interests shall be placed in the same bargaining
unit.'" Id. (quoting In re Chrysler Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 55, 58-59 (1948)).
10. See, e.g., Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 363-64.
11. See id. at 364.
12. Representation Management ("RM") elections are provided for in 29 U.S.C.
1999] 1927
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An employer that does any of these actions without an objective
reasonable doubt as to the union's majority status commits an unfair
labor practice. 4 Despite the risk of an unfair labor practices charge,
an employer that believes it can satisfy the objective reasonable doubt
standard has a legal incentive to do at least one of these actions
because bargaining with a union that lacks majority support is itself
an unfair labor practice.15 Although the Board's standard resembles
the jury trial reasonable doubt standard, the Board has historically
interpreted its standard to be more demanding than the latter
standard. 6 In Allentown Mack, the Court rejected the Board's more
rigorous interpretation of objective reasonable doubt and substituted
a simple jury standard in its place.'
This Note first examines the facts of Allentown Mack and the
Supreme Court's disposition of the case.' After reviewing the
relationship between the Board and the Court,19 the Note outlines the
§ 159(c)(1). Under this provision, an employer with a good faith reasonable doubt about
the level of union support can file a petition for a Board-supervised election. See Maria
Fabre Manuel, Comment, Abolishing the Withdrawal of Recognition Doctrine: Serious
Doubts About the Good Faith Doubt Test, 55 LA. L. REv. 913, 916-17 (1995). A union
that loses an RM election faces loss of recognition as the representative of the employer's
employees. See id
13. Unlike RM elections, an employer's right to withdraw recognition of a union,
once it has a good faith reasonable doubt about the level of support for the union, is not a
right conferred on it by the Act; the Board created the right to withdraw in Celanese Corp.
of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951): "[T]he employer can, without violating the Act,
refuse to bargain with a union on the ground that it doubts the union's majority, provided
that the doubt is in good faith." Id. at 672.
14. An employer commits an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the NLRA
whenever it interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in any way in connection with
their right to engage in concerted activities, protect working conditions, and join labor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994);
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 45 (3d ed. 1993).
15. See NLRB v. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612 F.2d 1326, 1328 (1st Cir. 1979).
16. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking
and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. RnV. 387, 394 (1995). The Board applies a
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether its objective reasonable doubt
standard has been met, but the case law reveals that circumstantial evidence is rarely
enough to satisfy the objective reasonable doubt test. See id. at 394 n.33 (citing Walkill
Valley Gen. Hosp., 288 N.L.R.B. 103, 107-09 (1998) (holding that high employee turnover,
decreasing union membership, and filing of a decertification petition signed by fewer than
half the employees did not satisfy the objective reasonable doubt standard and justify the
employer's unilateral withdrawal of recognition); Century Papers, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 103,
107-109 (1998) (holding that mere employee criticism of the union does not give rise to a
good faith reasonable doubt as to the union's majority status); Petroskey Geriatric Village,
Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 800, 804 (1989) (stating that union inactivity is not enough to constitute
an objective reasonable doubt about union support)).
17. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 366-71; infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 26-102 and accompanying text.
19. See iofra notes 103-80 and accompanying text.
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Board's adoption and application of the polling standard." The Note
then reviews the history of the polling standard controversy in the
courts of appeals.2' A discussion of Allentown Mack's significance in
light of the Board's historic relationship with the Court and the
specific facts of the polling standard controversy follows.0 The Note
asserts that the Court usurped the Board's role when it rewrote the
polling standard' and considers allegations that the Board regularly
disguises policymaking as factfinding. 4 Finally, the Note contends
that judicial review of the sort practiced by the Court in Allentown
Mack may prove more costly than beneficialY
On December 20, 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc. sold its Allentown,
Pennsylvania factory branch to managers of the factory.2 6  The
managers formed Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. and hired thirty-two of
the factory's forty-five former employees2 7 Prior to the sale of the
factory, Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, represented the
employees.m Both before and after the sale, at least eleven Mack
employees made statements indicating that the union had lost support
among the workers.29 Of those employees, eight made statements
during job interviews suggesting that they no longer supported the
union.30 Three employees made comments essential to the Court's
resolution of the case: (1) Ron Mohr, a union official, informed one
of the managers that if a vote were taken, the union would lose;31 (2)
Kermit Bloch told a manager that he was certain the entire night shift
did not support the union;32 and (3) Dennis Marsh said to a manager
that the union did not adequately represent his interests for the
amount of dues he paid.33
On January 2, 1991, the incumbent union, pursuant to beginning
negotiations for a new contract, requested that Allentown Mack
20. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 191-235 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 236-69 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 236-58 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
26. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 362.
27. See id.
28. See i. at 361-62.
29. See hi. at 362, 369.
30. See i. at 362.
31. See id.
32. See id. The entire night shift consisted of five or six employees. See i.
33. See id. at 369.
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recognize it as the employees' collective bargaining representative. 4
Allentown Mack declined to extend recognition, citing a" 'good faith
doubt' "as to the union's majority status." After informing the union
that it intended to poll employees to determine the level of support
for the union, the corporation conducted the poll on February 8,
1991.36 The union lost by a vote of nineteen to thirteen and
subsequently filed an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB. 7
An administrative law judge ("ALP) found that Allentown
Mack was a successor employer 8 to Mack and was therefore
obligated to bargain with the union.39  Allentown Mack's successor
status also entitled the union to a rebuttable presumption of
continuing support.' Nevertheless, the AL excluded the testimony
of Ron Mohr, Kermit Bloch, and Dennis Marsh because of its
questionable reliability.41 Based on the remaining evidence, the ALT
ruled that the corporation violated the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act")42 when it conducted its poll because it did not
have an objective reasonable doubt about the union's majority
status.43 The NLRB adopted the ALJ's findings and ordered
Allentown Mack to recognize the union.'
34. See id. at 362.
35. Id. (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1205 (1995),
enforced, 83 F.3d 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1996), rev'd, 552 U.S. 359 (1998)).
36. See id
37. See id at 362-63.
38. A "successor employer" is one who has purchased or assumed a business and has
become liable for the labor obligations of its predecessor. See B. Glenn George,
Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 277 (1988).
Determining whether an employer is a successor employer can be difficult given "the
almost unlimited variations of business transfers in which the issue can arise." Id. When a
change in ownership is effectuated by a simple stock purchase "without an intervening
break or change in operations," a new employer's liability for its predecessor's labor
obligations is easiest to establish. Id. When, however, merger or acquisition of a
company's assets results in significant changes in "the size, scope or direction of the
enterprise," a new employer's liability is more difficult to establish. Id. at 278.
39. See Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1204.
40. See id
41. See id. at 1207-08. The evidentiary presumptions and factual circumstances that
led the ALT to exclude this testimony are detailed infra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1994).
43. See Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1208. The AIL held that Allentown Mack
violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (5). See Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1208.
Subsection (a)(1) forbids any attempt by employers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" them by the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1). Subsection (a)(5) imposes a duty on an employer to "bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees." Id. § 158(a)(5).
44. See Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. at 1199-1201.
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit enforced the Board's order.45
Allentown Mack had urged the court to hold that the Board's polling
standard was too strict and that under the appropriate lesser standard
Allentown Mack's poll was legal.4 6 Although admitting that it was
not satisfied with the unitary standard, the court declined to replace
the NLRB's polling standard with a lower "judicially-created"
standard.47 Turning to the evidence, the court held that Allentown
Mack failed to satisfy the existing polling standard" and agreed with
the Board that the AJ's exclusion of Dennis Marsh's testimony was
consistent with NLRB precedent holding that anti-union sentiments
expressed during job interviews are unreliable.4 9 The court also found
that the exclusion of statements made by Kermit Bloch and Ron
Mohr was consistent with the Board's historic reluctance to give
credence to unverified individual employee reports of "the antipathy
of other employees toward their union.""
The Supreme Court granted Allentown Mack's request for
certiorari and, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by
a shifting majority of Justices, reversed the D.C. Circuit." The Court
held that the Board's polling standard was rational,52 that the Board
had incorrectly interpreted its own standard,53 and that the Board's
determination that Allentown Mack lacked an objective reasonable
doubt about the union's majority status was not supported by
substantial evidence.54 The Court proceeded to condemn the Board's
alleged practice of subtly altering its rules through adjudication rather
45. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1488 (D.C. Cir.
1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
46. See id. at 1485. Three other circuits had held previously that the Board's polling
standard was too high and had substituted in its place a "substantial, objective evidence"
test. Mingtree Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1984); Thomas
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc.
651 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). For a discussion of these decisions and
the substantial, objective evidence test, see infra notes 191-226 and accompanying text.
47. See Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1487.
48. See id. at 1487-88.
49. See id. at 1488 (citing Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 888, 894,
enforced, 590 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir. 1978)). The court also noted that Board precedent does
not allow an employee's expressions of mere dissatisfaction with the quality of union
representation to be treated as opposition to the union. See id. (citing Destileria Serralles,
Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 51, 52 (1988), enforced, 882 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1989)).
50. Id. (citing Westbrook Bowl, 293 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 n.11 (1989); Louisiana-
Pacific Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1080 n.6 (1987); Sofco, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 159, 160 n.10
(1983)).
51. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 360,380.
52. See id. at 363-66; infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
53. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 366-67; infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
54. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 367-71; infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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than by promulgating policy changes through rulemaking 5
The Court rejected Allentown Mack's argument that the
NLRB's unitary standard was irrational.56  The corporation had
argued that the NLRB's standard failed to provide employers with
any legal incentive to poll because the same reasonable doubt
standard applied to polling, Board-supervised RM elections, and
unilateral withdrawals of recognition by employers. 7  While
admitting that the NLRB's unitary standard for polling, elections, and
withdrawals was "in some respects a puzzling policy," the Court
nevertheless concluded that the standard was neither irrational nor
capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").51 The Court offered two reasons why an employer might
want to poll employees even when it has the good faith doubt
required for withdrawal of recognition. First, an abrupt withdrawal of
recognition could antagonize employees.59 Second, the likelihood of
being charged with an unfair labor practice is significantly lower for
polling than for withdrawal.60
Despite holding that the unitary standard is not irrational, the
Court took issue with the NLRB's definition and application of the
reasonable doubt standard in the instant case.6' At oral argument, the
NLRB had asserted that "doubt" means either "uncertainty" or
"disbelief" and that it is the latter definition that the Board applies to
its reasonable doubt polling standard.62 After consulting several
dictionaries, the Court concluded that uncertainty, not disbelief, is the
proper definition of doubt.6 3  As reformulated by the Court, the
correct standard in polling cases is whether a reasonable jury could
find that an employer had a reasonable uncertainty about the union's
majority status when the employer polled its employees. 6
55. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 372-80; infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
56. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 363-66. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined this portion of the majority opinion. See id. at 360.
57. See id. at 363-64.
58. Id at 364. The APA provides that federal courts may overturn an agency action if
the action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
59. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 365.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 366-71. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined this portion of the opinion. See id. at 360.
62. See id. at 367.
63. See id. (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 555 (3d ed. 1992); THE NEW
SHORTER OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 734 (1993); WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 776 (2d ed. 1949)).
64. See id.
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The Court then reviewed the evidence presented using this
standard and concluded that the Board's findings were not supported
by substantial evidence.65 It noted that the NLRB itself had found
that statements by seven of thirty-two employees (or roughly twenty
percent of Allentown Mack's workforce) supported a good faith
reasonable doubt as to the union's majority status.6 The Court also
criticized the AIJ and the NLRB for discounting the statements of
Kermit Bloch, Dennis Marsh, and Ron Mohr, describing the
comments of all three men as probative.67 The Court held that the
statements of the seven employees, taken together with those made
by Bloch, Marsh, and Mohr, compelled a finding that Allentown
Mack had a reasonable good faith doubt about the union's majority
status.6
In the final portion of its opinion,69 the Court considered
Allentown Mack's assertion that the NLRB has in practice, though
not in principle, forsaken the good faith doubt test in favor of a strict
head count test.7° Without reaching a definitive conclusion on the
validity of this assertion, the Court undertook to determine whether
the NLRB has the authority to apply consistently a different standard
from the one it has previously announced it would apply7
The Court began its analysis with the premise that the APA
establishes a system of "'reasoned decisionmaking' " to govern an
administrative agency's promulgation of rules and adjudication of
cases arising under those rules.72 This system dictates that the process
through which agencies such as the NLRB reach their results be
"logical and rational."73 Applying a different standard than the one
announced impedes not only consistent application of the law by
subordinate agency actors but also effective judicial review of agency
decisions.74 From these premises, the Court deduced that an agency's
65. See id. at 367-71.
66. See id. at 368. The Court, however, declined to hold that "20% first-hand-
confirmed-opposition ... [to the union] ... is alone enough to require a conclusion of
reasonable doubt." Id. at 369.
67. See id. at 369-70.
68. See id. at 371.
69. See id. at 372-80. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined this portion of the majority opinion. See id. at 360.
70. The head count test requires an employer to prove that a majority of the
employee bargaining unit has actually repudiated the union. See id. at 373.
71. See id at 373-74.
72- Id. at 374 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,52 (1983)).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 375.
1999] 1933
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
application of a different standard than the one it articulates amounts
to "unreasoned decisionmaking" in violation of the APA.75  The
NLRB does not, the Court noted, promulgate its rules through the
rulemaking process employed by every other administrative agency
but rather develops them in the course of adjudicating individual
cases.76  The Court determined that the APA's reasoned
decisionmaking requirement applies to policymaking by
adjudication 77 and refused to allow the NLRB to modify "subtly and
obliquely" its policies by consistently applying different standards
than those it purports to apply.78 To hold otherwise, said the Court,
would be to allow the NLRB to impede judicial review and political
oversight by disguising policymaking as factfinding.79
The Court pointed out that the NLRB is free to adopt a more
rigorous standard for polling than the reasonable doubt standard if it
does so "forthrightly and explicitly."8 Similarly, the Board can adopt
counterfactual evidentiary presumptions that would be subject to
judicial review for their reasonableness. 81 Absent such forthright and
explicit presumptions, however, the NLRB "must draw all the
inferences that the evidence fairly demands."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's view that
the Board's unitary standard is rational.83 He began by examining the
text of the NLRA in search of support for the Board's position and
concluded the NLRA does not address polling.' Because the Act is
silent on polling, the Chief Justice located any authority that the
Board might have to regulate polling in the NLRA's general
provision prohibiting employer practices that "'interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise' of their right to bargain
collectively."85 In his estimation, the Board had failed to demonstrate
how polling done in accordance with procedural safeguards, and
75. Id.
76. See id. at 374; infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
77. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 374.
78. Id. at 376.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 378.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. See id. 380 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See id. at 382 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. (Rehnquist, C.., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1994)). The NLRB had argued that the statutory basis for its authority to
regulate polling is found in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with its employees' representatives. See
Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 382 n.1.
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without overt coercion, violated the NLRA.86
The Chief Justice further noted that the disparate effects which
polling, RM elections, and unilateral withdrawals of recognition have
on the workplace make the application of a unitary standard to all
three practices irrational.' The Board's rationale for the unitary
standard is that it promotes the NLRA's goal of peaceful relations
between employers and employees.s8  Polling and withdrawal,
however, have "dramatically different effects" on the workplace: 89 A
unilateral withdrawal of recognition creates a significantly greater
disturbance in the workplace than polling doesY0 Consequently, the
Chief Justice maintained, the standard for assessing the propriety of
withdrawals should be higher.91
Dissenting in part, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Scalia that
the NLRB's unitary standard is not irrational, yet disagreed with the
majority's holding that the agency's findings were not supported by
substantial evidence.92  He criticized the majority for ignoring
evidentiary presumptions that the Board has developed to guide
ALJs in their application of the good faith doubt standard.93 He also
cited precedent to bolster his argument that the Court may upset a
Board action only if the Board "'misapprehended or grossly
86. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
87. See id. at 384-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See id. at 381 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 385 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See id. (Rehnquist, C.., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating
that the standard for withdrawing union recognition should be higher than that for
polling), rev'd, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). The Chief Justice also suggested that the NLRB's
polling standard might violate an employer's First Amendment right to solicit employee
views. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 386-88 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Citing a number of cases in support of this view, he concluded that
"the Board must allow polling where it does not tend to coerce or restrain employees." Id.
at 388 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-19 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945);
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941)). This argument is
potentially significant because, to the extent that polling cases involve freedoms protected
by the First Amendment, the judiciary may not be obliged to defer to the Board's findings
of fact. See Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases
After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2312,2314 (1998) (remarking that existing
precedent gives the courts authority to review independently facts giving rise to agency
adjudications when First Amendment rights are at stake).
92. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
93. See id. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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misapplied' "the relevant rule to the facts of a particular case. 4
Justice Breyer objected to the majority's treatment of the
Board's unitary standard in part because it omitted the phrase
"objective considerations" from its analysis of the NLRB's reasonable
doubt polling standard.95 This phrase is important because it denotes,
inter alia, rules of evidence that the Board applies to cases involving
employer polling, RM elections, and withdrawals of recognition.
According to Justice Breyer, the Court, rather than defer to the
Board's "specialized knowledge of the workplace," chose to ignore
these "[k]ey words of a technical sort" in its interpretation of the
Board's unitary standard, substituting instead its "common
understanding of human psychology" for the NLRB's expertise.96
Justice Breyer described the Court's refusal to view the evidence in
accordance with the NLRB's interpretation of its own rule as a
departure from "settled principles permitting agencies broad leeway
to interpret their own rules." 97
After expressing his disagreement with the majority's treatment
of the unitary standard, Justice Breyer reviewed the evidence in light
of the Board's relevant rules of evidence to determine what evidence
qualified as "objective considerations." Rather than surreptitiously
plotting to make policy under the guise of factfinding, the Board,
Justice Breyer concluded, merely followed its rules of evidence in
resolving the issues of the case-rules that the Court ignored in its
evaluation of the evidence.9 Echoing the D.C. Circuit's reasoning,
Justice Breyer argued that the exclusion of Dennis Marsh's statement
was rooted in the NLRB's rule that employee statements made
during job interviews with employers interested in a nonunionized
workforce reveal nothing about the employees' real attitudes
regarding the unions.99 Likewise, the exclusion of Kermit Bloch's
statement was supported by the NLRB's rule that a statement made
by one employee purporting to portray the views of other employees
is not "'objective' within the meaning of the 'objective reasonable
doubt' standard.""° Justice Breyer contended that, regardless of
94. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,491 (1951).
95. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9& See id. at 390-97 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. See id. at 392 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 888, 894, enforced, 590 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.
1978)).
100. Id. at 393-94 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
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whether Ron Mohr's statement should have been admitted,1 1 the
AL was well within his authority when he found that Allentown
Mack did not meet the NLRB's objective reasonable doubt standard,
even in light of other evidence.1 2
A proper understanding of the issues involved in Allentown
Mack requires an examination of the scope of the NLRB's authority
under the NLRA and the posture the Court has traditionally adopted
vis-A-vis that authority. Congress passed the NLRA in 1935 in part as
an attempt to end "the disruption of industry by labor-management
disputes."' 3 Although Congress has twice amended it substantially, 4
the Act continues to protect the rights of employees to join labor
organizations and bargain collectively through their chosen
representatives. 05 The NLRA also established the NLRB, investing
the Board with certain powers,0 6 including the powers to remedy
unfair labor practices'07 and to make, amend, and rescind any rules
Wallkill Valley Gen. Hosp., 288 N.L.R.B. 103, 109-10 (1988), enforced as modified, 866
F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1989)).
101. Allentown Mack argued to the D.C. Circuit that Mohr's statements were
admissible because Mohr was a union official and the Board has held that an employer
may rely in certain circumstances on a union official's admission that a union lacks
majority support. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1488
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Universal Life Ins., 169 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1119 (1968)), rev'd, 522
U.S. 359 (1998). The D.C. Circuit held, however, that the AU had adduced facts that
deprived Mohr's statements of "sufficient indicia of reliability" and had therefore properly
excluded it. Id The AIJ excluded Mohr's statement for several reasons. Mohr made the
statement prior to the sale of the factory. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. 316
N.L.R.B. 1199, 1207 (1995), enforced, 83 F.3d 1483 (1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
When he made it, he was referring to a Mack bargaining unit of 32 employees, only 23 of
whom were hired by Allentown Mack (that is, his statement did not purport to convey the
views of all Mack employees, and not all of those employees whose views he did purport
to represent were subsequently hired by Allentown Mack). See id. at 1208. Moreover,
Mohr himself did not oppose the Union. See id
102. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 397 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
103. 1 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28 (3d ed. 1992).
The Court long ago upheld the NLRA's constitutionality. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
104. Congress passed the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947 in an effort to mitigate
labor's perceived excesses under the original Act. See 1 HARDIN, supra note 103, at 35,
39. Among other things, Taft-Hartley split the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of
the NLRB. See GOULD, supra note 14, at 30. The General Counsel heads the
prosecutorial side, while a five-member board hears and decides cases. See id. The
Landum-Griffin amendments, passed in 1959, attempted to reduce union corruption. See
id. at 52.
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
106. See id § 153.
107. See id § 160(a). The language of this section is somewhat misleading. The NLRB
can "order" an employer or labor organization to cease an unfair labor practice, but the
only way the NLRB can compel a recalcitrant party to obey the order is to seek
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and regulations necessary to carry out the NLRA's provisions.1l 8 The
NLRA affords parties who lose a case before the Board a statutory
right to appeal the decision to the federal courts of appeals.10 9 This
appeal of right raises the question of what deference, if any, the
courts owe to the Board's decisions."0
The answer lies in the APA. It authorizes courts to overturn an
administrative agency's action only if the action is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.""' Consistent with this policy of judicial deference, the Seminole
Rock principle,"' as expressed in Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala,"1 requires federal courts to defer substantially to an agency's
interpretation of the rules it promulgates pursuant to the NLRA." 4
At issue in Thomas Jefferson was whether the Secretary of Health
and Human Services" 5 correctly interpreted a challenged regulation" 6
enforcement of the order in a court of appeals. See id § 160(e).
108. See id § 156.
109. See id § 160(f). Section 160(f) provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United
States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice ... was
alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
110. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
112. For an explanation of the Seminole Rock principle, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
113. 512 U.S. 504 (1994). Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion. See id. at
505.
114. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
115. The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
issue regulations that define reimbursable costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1994).
Acting pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has declared that hospitals may be
reimbursed for the costs of "approved educational activities." 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(a)(1)
(1998).
116. The regulation at issue was 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c). This regulation recognizes that
"[m]any [health care] providers engage in educational activities including training
programs for nurses, medical students, interns and residents," all of which "contribute to
the quality of patient care ... and are necessary to meet the community's needs." 42
C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1998). Because these programs are so important, the regulation
provides that Medicare "will participate... in the support of these activities." Id
This reimbursement policy is limited by the regulation's community support principle
and anti-distribution clause. See id The community support principle derives from the
regulation's statement that "the costs of such educational activities should be borne by the
community." Id Medicare will reimburse providers for educational activities of the kind
listed above only "[u]ntil communities undertake to bear these costs." Id The
regulation's anti-distribution clause prohibits providers from being reimbursed for
"increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions or
units to patient care institutions or units." Id
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to mean that the petitioner was not entitled, to reimbursement for
certain costs incurred by the petitioner's graduate medical education
programs. 7 The Court cited the APA and prior decisions as
authority for the proposition that the courts must give "substantial
deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.118
Under the "substantial deference" standard of review, a court may
not substitute its own interpretation of an agency's regulation for that
of the agency merely because the court's interpretation better serves
the "regulatory purpose.""19 Indeed, as explained by the Court,
"substantial deference" dictates that an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations be given " 'controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' "20 Turning to the
facts of the case, the Court upheld the Secretary's denial of
petitioner's claim, holding that the Secretary's actions were
predicated on an interpretation of the regulation's anti-redistribution
clause that was neither erroneous nor inconsistent with the
regulation's language. 2' Thomas Jefferson, then, limits courts' power
to invalidate an agency's interpretation of its own regulation when the
interpretation is neither" '"plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with
the regulation."' "I'
Regarding the NLRB, the deference question has been
complicated by the Board's unique approach to rulemaking. Most
117. See Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512-13. Between 1974 and 1983, Thomas
Jefferson University Hospital had sought and received reimbursement from Medicare for
salary-related graduate medical education ("GME") costs. See id. at 509. Subsequently,
however, the hospital sought reimbursement for nonsalary-related GME costs that it had
previously borne without seeking reimbursement from Medicare. See id. at 510. The
Secretary denied reimbursement after finding that to reimburse the hospital for nonsalary-
related GME costs would violate § 413.85(c)'s anti-distribution clause and community
support principle because these principles prohibited reimbursement for costs previously
and historically borne by the hospital. See id. at 511.
118. See id. at 512 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); Udall v. Talman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
119. See id.
120. Id (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); see
also Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16-17 (1965) (quoting the same language from Seminole Rock).
Such deference is especially warranted, said the Court, where, as here, the regulation at
issue is part of a highly complex regulatory scheme "in which the identification and
classification of relevant 'criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the
exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.'" Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512
(quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)).
121. See Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 513. Because the Court upheld the Secretary's
interpretation of the anti-redistribution clause, it did not rule on the Secretary's
interpretation of the regulation's community support principle. See id.
122. Id. (quoting Tallman, 380 U.S. at 17 (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414)).
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administrative agencies separate their rulemaking and adjudicatory
functions."2 One branch of the agency typically formulates rules in
accordance with the procedures outlined in the APA, while the other
branch hears and decides cases that arise under those rules. 24 Rather
than employ the rulemaking procedures detailed in the APA, the
Board almost always formulates its policies through its adjudicatory
function.'25 In other words, it announces policy in the course of
deciding individual cases. Criticized repeatedly for allowing its
adjudicatory function to swallow its rulemaking function, the NLRB
announces rules in cases to be applied prospectively without giving all
of those potentially affected an opportunity to offer their input. 26
This refusal to engage in rulemaking has often irritated the courts.127
The Supreme Court first dealt squarely with the Board's
predilection for rulemaking through adjudication in NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co."2 In Wyman-Gordon, the NLRB had ordered
an employer to furnish the union with a list of employees prior to a
certification election, deriving its power from its own precedent. 29
The Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Board may
123. See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 7.1-7.14, 8.1-8.6, at 287-401
(describing the legislative and adjudicatory functions of administrative agencies).
124. The APA prescribes several procedures that agencies must observe when
exercising their rulemaking powers designed to provide notice and a chance for input to
interested parties. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
125. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 374; Flynn, supra note 16, at 391.
126. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 16, at 392 (noting that commentators have "been
almost universally critical of" the Board's refusal to engage in rulemaking); Cornelius J.
Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy
Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 260-63 (1968)
(criticizing the Board's "persistent refusal to utilize its rule-making powers despite the
urging of practitioners, academicians, and judges that it do so").
127. See Flynn, supra note 16, at 418-19. The Board's relations with the lower federal
courts have been further complicated by the Board's persistent refusal to acquiesce to
contrary circuit law. See, e.g., id. at 389 n.12; infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text
(describing the Board's refusal to abandon the objective reasonable doubt test despite
criticism from some courts of appeals).
128. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
129. See id. at 761-62 (plurality opinion). The rule relied upon by the Board in
Wyman-Gordon was enunciated in Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 123, 1239-40
(1966). See Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 762. In Excelsior, the Board concluded that
"basic fairness" requires employers to provide lists to unions with the names and
addresses of employees eligible to vote in union elections. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at
1239-40. Since Excelsior Underwear had no prior notice of the newly-created obligation
to provide lists, the nascent rule was not applied to the company. Instead, the Board
announced that the rule would be binding in future cases. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at
1240 n.5, 1246; see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.8, at 269-72 (discussing
Excelsior).
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announce by adjudication rules that are to be applied prospectively. 130
The Court upheld the Board's order, though no single rationale for
the decision commanded a majority of Justices.'
The plurality rejected the idea that the NLRB can formulate
general policies through adjudication. 132  The APA's rulemaking
provisions were enacted "to assure fairness and mature consideration
of rules of general application." 33 According to the plurality, these
provisions may not be circumvented by promulgating rules during
adjudicatory proceedings" 34 Nevertheless, the plurality upheld the
Board's order on the grounds that the Board had the authority to
subpoena an employee list under § 11(1) of the NLRA 35
Concurring in the result, Justice Black disagreed with the
plurality's assertion that the Board may make rules only by following
the APA's rulemaking procedures.13  Administrative agencies,
Justice Black remarked, must frequently formulate new rules to settle
controversies to which no antecedent rule applies.137 Rules made in
the course of adjudication guide future agency action much like rules
130. See Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 764 (plurality opinion).
131. Justice Fortas wrote for the plurality and was joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Stewart and White. See id. at 761 (plurality opinion). Justice Black, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the result. See id at 769 (Black, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Douglas dissented, see id. at 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting),
as did Justice Harlan, see id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. See id at 764 (plurality opinion).
133. Id (plurality opinion).
134. See id. (plurality opinion).
135. See id. at 768-69 (plurality opinion). Section 11(1) of the NRLA permits the
Board to access "any evidence ... that relates to any matter under investigation or in
question." 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1994). Professors Davis and Pierce criticize the plurality
opinion in Wyman-Gordon as difficult to interpret because
the conclusion that the order was valid seems to render meaningless all of the
prior reasoning about the necessity for rulemaking. If an agency can use a "rule"
announced in an adjudication as the sole basis for valid orders directing all others
to engage in conduct that conforms to the "rule," such a "rule" would seem to
have the same effect as an APA rule issued through notice and comment
procedures.
1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.8, at 270. They go on, however, to argue that
the plurality opinion in Wyman-Gordon is not quite the exercise in futility it first
appears to be. The plurality's point is that the order addressed to Wyman-
Gordon would be valid with or without the "rule" announced in Excelsior. The
Excelsior "rule" did not depend for its validity on the resolution of any contested
issue of material fact. The agency announced the "rule" in Excelsior solely
because it comported with the agency's conception of fair electoral procedure.
NLRB could have announced and applied the Excelsior "rule" for the first time
in Wyman-Gordon.
Id"
136. See Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 769-70 (Black, J., concurring in the result).
137. See id. at 770-71 (Black, J., concurring in the result).
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promulgated under the APA's rulemaking procedures.13 Moreover,
the APA "confer[s] on ... administrative agencies the power to
proceed by adjudication... and ... specifie[s] a distinct procedure by
which this adjudicatory power is to be exercised." '139 Turning to the
text of the NLRA, Justice Black pointed out that it expresses no
preference between rulemaking and adjudication as vehicles for
promulgating rules.14° Thus, he concluded that the NLRA and APA
confer on the Board the authority to decide whether to proceed by
rulemaking or adjudication. 4'
Not until NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 42 in 1974 did the Court
recognize decisively the NLRB's power to make rules through
adjudication. In Bell Aerospace, the Court reversed a Second Circuit
decision holding that the Board could determine whether buyers are
managerial employees only by invoking its rulemaking procedures.4
138. See id. at 771 (Black, J., concurring in the result).
139. Id. (Black, J., concurring in the result).
140. See id. (Black, J., concurring in the result).
141. See id. at 772 (Black, J., concurring in the result); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
1, § 6.8, at 271 (noting that Black's opinion "explicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of an
agency decision to make new 'rules' solely through the process of adjudication").
Justices Douglas and Harlan each issued a dissent in Wyman-Gordon. See Wyman-
Gordon, 394 U.S. at 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
two Justices agreed that an agency does not adjudicate where, as in Excelsior, it announces
a rule that is prospective only, and that any rule so announced is invalid. See id. at 777
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Citing concerns about notice,
Justice Douglas opined that because the rule in Excelsior was "a statement of far-reaching
policy covering all future representation elections," the Board should have been
compelled to subject the rule to the "public hearing prescribed by the [APA]." Id. at 777
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that to permit the NLRB to enforce an
invalid order of the sort contained in Excelsior would be to trivialize the APA's
rulemaking provisions. See id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Justices nonetheless
conceded that an agency may announce a rule in an order adjudicating a case and apply it
in subsequent cases. See id. at 777 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
142. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Justice Powell authored the Court's opinion. See id. at 268.
143. See id. at 290. Whether buyers are "managerial employees" is an issue of some
importance, at least to the buyers, since the NLRA does not cover managerial employees.
See id. at 275. This "managerial employee" exception to the Act's protections is rooted in
the Act's exclusion of supervisory employees from its purview. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1994). The Act defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11). The Board deems managerial employees to be supervisors within the
meaning of § 152(11) because they "are in a position to formulate, determine and
effectuate management policies." Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). For
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After reviewing prior case law, the Court determined that the Board
is free to promulgate labor policy through either its adjudicatory or
rulemaking function and that the choice of which to use is left to the
Board's discretion.'"
Despite its willingness to allow the Board to announce rules
through adjudication, the Court has sometimes shown little respect
for the rules themselves. In general, the Court has deferred to the
Board's findings of fact;145 however, at one time the Court tended to
substitute its judgment for the Board's on legal questions. 46 In
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Local 1212,147 the
Court rejected the Board's longstanding interpretation of its duties
under § 10(k) of the NLRA.'4 This section directs the NLRB to
"hear and determine the dispute out of which [an] unfair labor
practice shall have arisen."'49  The issue in Radio & Television
this reason, it has "customarily excluded" them from the protections of the NLRA. Id.
144. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295. The Court came close to distorting the
Wyman-Gordon decision in its review of precedent. First, it ignored the fact that a
majority of Justices did not agree on the Board's authority to make policy by adjudication.
More particularly, it ignored parts of the plurality opinion contesting the Board's authority
to make policy through adjudication. Instead, the Court rather misleadingly quoted
Justice Fortas's admission that adjudicated cases" 'generally provide a guide to action that
the agency may be expected to take in future cases.' " Id at 294 (quoting Wyman-
Gordon, 394 U.S. at 766 (plurality opinion)). This admission was hardly a ringing
endorsement of rulemaking by adjudication.
Despite this disingenuity, Bell Aerospace is apparently the last word on the issue of
agency rulemaking by adjudication. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 6.8, at 272-73
("The [Supreme] Court has not even suggested that a court can constrain an agency's
choice between rulemaking and adjudication in any opinion since Bell Aerospace.").
145. The NLRA dictates as much; when a Board decision is reviewed by a federal
court, the "findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e). The APA makes the substantial evidence test applicable to all formal agency
findings, whether adopted through adjudication or rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E);
2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 11.2, at 176.
Through Justice Frankfurter, the Court provided the definitive explication of
§ 706(2)(E) in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Prior to Universal
Camera, some courts had interpreted the substantial evidence test to require the exclusion
of any evidence inconsistent with agency findings of fact. See id. at 487-88; 2 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 1, § 11.2, at 176. The Court rejected this interpretation of § 706(2)(E),
holding that "[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488. In other words,
the courts must consider the "whole record" when applying the substantial evidence test.
See id.
146. See 2 HARDIN, supra note 103, at 1891 (noting that "many courts tended to
substitute their judgment for the Board's if they found the Board in error on a legal
issue").
147. 364 U.S. 573 (1961). Justice Black authored the Court's opinion. See id. at 574.
148. See id at 586.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k).
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Broadcast Engineers was whether § 10(k) requires the Board to
resolve a dispute between two unions when that dispute is the
underlying cause of an unfair labor practices charge filed by an
employer against one of the unions.15 0 Relying on its prior cases
interpreting § 10(k), the Board simply ordered the union against
which the charge was brought to cease striking.15  The Court
interpreted the Board's duties under § 10(k) more broadly, however,
and held that § 10(k) authorized and obligated the Board to settle the
underlying dispute between the two unions.52 The Court thus
overruled the Board's own interpretation of its duties under the
NLRA.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 53 signaled the beginning of a more
deferential approach by the Court to the Board's resolution of legal
issues. At issue in Gissel was whether the NLRB may, as a remedy
for serious and pervasive unfair labor practices, order an employer to
bargain with a union whose representative status derives solely from
union authorization cards acquired from a majority of employees."4
The employers argued that the Board could compel bargaining only
after a certification election in which the unions proved victorious
because Board-supervised elections are the preferred means of
establishing majority support for a union.55 The Board ordered the
employers to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and to
bargain with the unions.56 A unanimous Court upheld the Board's
order.57 The Court agreed with the Board that the employers'
behavior had destroyed the opportunity for certification elections and
150. See Radio & Television Broad. Eng'rs, 364 U.S. at 578.
151. See id. at 578.
152. See id. at 579.
153. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Chief Justice Warren authored the Court's opinion. See id.
at 569. In Gissel, the Court consolidated four cases raising the same issue. See id.
154. See id. at 579. The tactics employed by the employers to weaken the drive for
unionization included questioning employees about union activities, threatening to fire
employees working towards unionization, and promising benefits to employees opposing
unionization. See id. at 583.
155. See id. at 596. The NLRA outlines the steps to be followed for union certification.
First, a petition must be filed by an employer or, if the employer refuses, by the
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1994). The Board then investigates the petition to
determine if a "question of representation affecting commerce exists." Id. If such a
question does exist, the Board "shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice."
Id. Finally, "[i]f the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of
representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof." Id.
156. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 585.
157. See id. at 615-16. The Court upheld the Board's order in one case, but remanded
the other three because the Board had failed to make findings of unlawful refusal to
bargain in those cases. See id.
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that the Board could therefore order them to bargain with the unions
once authorization cards had been signed by a majority of
employees.158
The Court continued this emerging policy of deference in Beth
Israel Hospital v. NLRB15 9 by upholding the Board's invalidation of a
hospital's rule that drastically restricted the areas of the hospital in
which the union could solicit employee support."6 Recognizing that
Congress has explicitly entrusted the NLRB with developing and
applying the nation's labor policy, the Court dismissed the hospital's
argument that the principle of limited judicial review does not apply
to Board decisions. 6' The Court delineated a narrow "judicial role"
in labor policy: Courts may review rules adopted by the Board only
for rationality and consistency with the NLRA.162 Moreover, the
Board's applications of its rules must be enforced, according to the
majority in Beth Israel, "if supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole."'163
In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,164 the Court offered
a powerful endorsement of the Board's authority under the NLRA to
develop and apply labor policies. The issue in Curtin Matheson was
whether an employer can have the good faith doubt required for
withdrawing recognition of a union when the union is on strike and
over half of the employer's workers are replacement workers. 6
Earlier in its history, the Board had adopted the presumption that
replacement workers do not support unions. 66 It later adopted the
opposite presumption that replacement workers do support the union
whose members they replace. 67 In Curtin Matheson, the Board
158. See id at 610-13 (citing NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757
(2d Cir. 1940)); GOULD, supra note 14, at 82-83.
159. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
160. See id at 488-89. The employer limited the distribution of union literature to
certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. See id. at 486. The Board found that the
employer's "no distribution" rule violated the NLRA. See Beth Isr. Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B.
1193, 1199 (1976), enforced in part, 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
The Court agreed: "We have long accepted the Board's view that the right of employees
to self-organize and bargain collectively [under the Act] necessarily encompasses the right
effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite."
Beth Isr. Hosp., 437 U.S. at 491.
161. See Beth Isr. Hosp., 437 U.S. at 500-01 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)).
162. See id. at 501.
163. Id.
164. 494 U.S. 775 (1990). Justice Marshall authored the Court's opinion. See id. at 777.
165. See id. at 777.
166. See id at 779 (citing Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440,1444 (1959)).
167. See id at 780 (citing Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507,509 (1975)).
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refused to apply any presumption regarding union support among
replacement workers and found the employer lacked the good faith
doubt required for withdrawing union recognition. 68 The Court
approved of the NLRB's refusal to presume anything about whether
replacement workers support the union.'69 While acknowledging that
the interests of replacement workers and union members are often
diametrically opposed, the Court agreed with the Board's
determination that economic necessity may cause a replacement
worker to cross the picket line even though he supports the union.7
The Court emphasized that the Board has the "primary responsibility
for developing and applying national labor policy"'7' and stated that it
will uphold any Board rule that is "rational and consistent" with the
NLRA 7 2 This result will occur even when the rule "represents a
departure from the Board's prior policy" and the Justices "would
have formulated a different rule had [they] sat on the Board."'173
Justice Scalia issued a portentous dissent. 74 Describing the
NLRB's decision as "a counterfactual policy determination," 75 he
accused the Board of "disguis[ing] policymaking as factfinding ... to
escape the legal and political limitations to which policymaking is
subject." 76 Conceding that the Board is free to forbid rational
inferences or to require nonrational inferences, Justice Scalia
contended that the Board had done neither in this case. 7 Rather, the
Board had explicitly determined not to require any presumption
about whether replacement workers support the union . 7  After
ostensibly eschewing any presumptions, however, the Board had
168. See Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350,352-53 (1987), enforcement
denied, 859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S.
at 781-82.
169. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 777.
170. See id. at 789.
171. Id. at 786.
172. Id. at 787.
173. Id. As one observer notes, the Court upheld the Board's refusal to presume that
replacement workers oppose the union "in the face of unanimous opposition in the
circuits." Flynn, supra note 16, at 405.
174. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This practice of disguising policymaking as
factfinding to evade effective legislative and judicial oversight is precisely the type of
adjudicatory legerdemain that Justice Scalia condemns in Allentown Mack. See supra
notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
177. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350,
352 (1987), enforcement denied, 859 F.2d 362 (1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
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refused to draw the inferences dictated by the facts of the case.179
Justice Scalia thought the facts of the case compelled a finding that
the employer had a good faith reasonable doubt about union support
since more than half of its employees were replacement workers with
interests inimical to those of the striking workers.Y8 0
The above history of the Board's relationship with the Supreme
Court reveals a trend of increased judicial deference to the Board
over time. The judiciary's treatment of the polling standard stands in
marked contrast to this trend.
The Board first applied the unitary standard to employer polling
in Montgomery Ward & Co.'8' There, the ALJ held that the company
committed an unfair labor practice when it polled its employees.' In
reaching this decision, the ALJ accepted the view that an employer
may poll its employees only when it entertains the kind of good faith
doubt about a union's majority status necessary for an RM election or
a withdrawal of recognition.8 3 If polling were otherwise unchecked,
employers could repeatedly use polls to challenge the majority status
of unions.Y Such activities would create a "recurrent state of
turbulence" in labor relations. 85 The Board affirmed the ALJ's
decision, agreeing that an employer must have "objective
considerations justifying a belief in the Union's lack of continuing
majority status" before polling its employees. 6
The good faith reasonable doubt (or objective reasonable doubt)
test has been criticized on a variety of grounds.' The central
criticism is that it is unclear what the standard requires of an
employer. The Board's case-by-case approach creates a fluid
standard that changes with the views of the Board and courts.8
Some commentators argue that the Board will find a good faith doubt
179. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974).
182. See id. at 717.
183. See id. at 724.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 717.
187. See generally Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to
an Incumbent Union, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653 (arguing that the standard for RM elections
should be lowered); Manuel, supra note 12, at 913 (advocating the abolition of employers'
ability to withdraw unilaterally recognition of unions).
188. See Manuel, supra note 12, at 921. This fluidity is problematic for the employer
because it inhibits the employer's ability to predict whether the evidence it has gathered
will satisfy the Board that it acted with a good faith reasonable doubt as to the union's
majority status. See id. at 922.
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only where the employer's evidence also shows a loss of majority in
fact.189 In other words, the Board has "collapsed the good faith doubt
test into the loss of majority in fact test."'190
The courts of appeals have been highly critical of the NLRB's
unitary standard. The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to address the
polling standard directly. In NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc.,'91 the
employer withdrew recognition from the union after conducting a
poll, which revealed that a majority of employees did not support the
union.19 The Board argued on appeal that the employer committed
an unfair labor practice when it conducted the poll. 93 The court
interpreted the NLRB's polling standard to mean that an employer
may conduct a poll only when it has the reasonable doubt requisite
for withdrawal of recognition. 94 According to the Fifth Circuit, the
Board's standard makes polling useless;195 the standard ignores the
fact that polling could be a useful tool when an employer sincerely
doubts a union's majority status but lacks the objective evidence
necessary for withdrawing recognition. 96 The court rejected the
objective reasonable doubt standard for polling in favor of a
"substantial, objective evidence" test.197 This test, as articulated by
the court, allows an employer who has not engaged in unfair labor
practices to poll employees if there is substantial, objective evidence
of a loss of union support insufficient to sustain a withdrawal of
recognition.98 Additionally, the employer must give the union
advance notice of the poll and then conduct it in accordance with the
procedural safeguards that the Board set forth for pre-certification
polls in Strusknes Construction Co.99 The court concluded, however,
189. See Flynn, supra note 187, at 679; Manuel, supra note 12, at 922. The Board
maintains that the two tests are still distinct. See, e.g., Sofco, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 159, 159-60
(1983) (noting that the good faith doubt test, as opposed to the loss of majority in fact test,
depends on the totality of circumstances).
190. Flynn, supra note 187, at 679.
191. 651 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981).
192. See id. at 1142.
193. See id. at 1143.
194. See id at 1144.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 1145.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id. Strusknes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967), while permitting
employers to conduct pre-certification polls at will, outlined procedures to be observed in
pre-certification polls in an effort to prevent employer intimidation of employees. The
Strusknes restrictions are: (1) the poll's purpose must be to determine whether the union
enjoys majority support; (2) the employer must communicate that purpose to the
employees; (3) the employer must give assurances against reprisal; (4) the employees must
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that the employer in A.W. Thompson had failed to satisfy the
substantial, objective evidence test because of its history of repeated
unfair labor practices."00
The substantial, objective evidence test established in A.W.
Thompson was embraced by the Sixth Circuit in Thomas Industries,
Inc. v. NLRB. 0' In Thomas, the Board found that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice when it polled its employees to
determine the level of union support.202 The employer had argued
that it had a good faith reasonable doubt when it conducted the poll
because of "negative employee comments, employee resignations
from the Union, resignations by Union officials, and a sharp decrease
in the number of employees on Union dues check-off."' 3 The court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the Board's unitary standard allows
an employer to take a poll only where no poll is needed.2 04 The sole
purpose of a poll under the unitary standard is to act as a "double-
check" on the "employer's already sufficient evidence to refuse to
bargain. "205 The court determined that the evidence that the
employer had offered was sufficient to satisfy the substantial,
objective evidence test and refused to enforce the Board's order.0 6
The Ninth Circuit addressed the polling standard controversy in
be polled by secret ballot; and (5) the employer must not engage in unfair labor practices
or otherwise create a coercive atmosphere during the poll. See id. at 1063. Because of
certain differences between pre- and post-recognition situations, the Board itself has
declined to allow employers to conduct post-certification polls at will. See Montgomery
Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717,724-25 (1974). In pre-recognition situations, it is proper to
require the union to prove its claim of majority status. See id. at 724. In post-recognition
situations, the union's majority status is presumed. See id. Giving an employer "an
unrestricted license to search for proof of the union's loss of majority" under such
circumstances "contravene[s] a basic objective of the Act, that is, guaranteeing employees
the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." Id.
200. See NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.
1981). During the 16 years prior to this case in which the union was the certified
bargaining representative of A.W. Thompson's employees, A.W. Thompson had
concluded only three collective bargaining agreements. See id. At the expiration of each
of these agreements, A.W. Thompson had withdrawn recognition of the union and "taken
advantage of the drawn-out nature of Board enforcement proceedings to delay the
resumption of good-faith bargaining." Id. These practices had twice led the Fifth Circuit
to hold A.W. Thompson liable for unfair labor practices. See id.
201. 687 F.2d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 1982).
202. See id. at 864.
203. Id. at 865. The check-off is a contractual arrangement under which an employer
agrees to deduct union dues from employee wages and transfer them to the union. See
MERRIFIELD ET AL., supra note 8, at 132-33.
204. See Thomas, 687 F.2d at 867.
205. Id
206. See id.
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Mingtree Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB.2 7 There, the NLRB had held that
the employer polled its employees to determine the level of union
support0 8 The court characterized the Board's polling standard as
"tantamount to an outright prohibition of employer-sponsored
polls."2 9 Unconvinced by the Board's argument that a lower polling
standard might result in widespread employer abuse of polling,210 the
court reasoned that the Strusknes guidelines for pre-certification
polling adequately protect employee interests in post-certification
polling.21' Polls, according to the court, are "objective, minimally
disruptive mechanism[s] for obtaining evidence of the level of union
support. 2 12  The Ninth Circuit proceeded to adopt the substantial,
objective evidence test articulated in A. W. Thompson and Thomas.213
The NLRB reaffirmed its commitment to its polling standard in
Texas Petrochemicals Corp2 1 4  There, an employer polled its
employees after receiving anti-union statements from twenty-three of
103 employees 1 5 The Board held that these statements alone did not
satisfy the objective reasonable doubt standard.216 The Board
excepted to the respective analyses of its polling standard by the three
courts of appeals." Declaring that the NLRA's ultimate goal is to
promote stability in collective-bargaining relationships, 218 the Board
cited the similar purposes and consequences of polling, RM elections,
and withdrawals of recognition as the basis for the unitary standard.2 9
Polling, like elections and withdrawals of recognition, is potentially
207. 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984).
20& See id. at 1296. Mingtree Restaurant had previously withdrawn a representation
petition after being advised that it would be dismissed for insufficient evidence of the
union's loss of majority support. See id.
209. Id. at 1297.
210. See id. at 1298.
211. See id. The Ninth Circuit explained:
In Strusknes, the Board stated that these guidelines, in the pre-recognition stage,
would serve as a "warranty" to the employees that a poll would not have some
unlawful object, contrary to the lawful purpose stated by the employer. We see
no reason why they would not serve just as well as a warranty in the post-
recognition situation.
Id. (citations omitted). But see supra note 199 (detailing reasons why the Board has
declined to extend Strusknes to post-certification situations).
212. Mingtree Restaurant, 736 F.2d at 1298.
213. See id. at 1299 (citing Thomas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863, 867-69 (6th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).
214. 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989).
215. See id. at 1057-58.
216. See id. at 1058.
217. See id. at 1059-63.
21& See id. at 1061.
219. See id. at 1060-61.
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disruptive of the collective-bargaining relationship and unsettling to
the employees involved. 20 Moreover, the "relative informality" of
polls, as opposed "to the strict procedural formality of Board-
conducted RM elections" is a reason for keeping the polling standard
high.?' The NLRB criticized the courts of appeals for recognizing the
disruptive effects of polling while at the same time lowering the
polling standard.m
The Board offered reasons why an employer might want to
conduct a poll, rather than withdraw recognition of a union, under the
unitary standard. First, an employer with a reasonable doubt about
union support necessarily retains "an inherent uncertainty about
whether the union has actually lost support."' A poll provides more
precise and reliable information about the union's support than does
an employer's reasonable doubt.224 Second, a properly conducted poll
minimizes damage to the employer-employee relationship and
evinces the employer's good faith to its employees in a way that a
sudden withdrawal of union recognition does not.25 Ultimately, then,
the Board not only refused to acquiesce to the contrary views
expressed by the courts of appeals about its polling standard, but it
also adduced reasons for the rationality of the standard, one of which
found its way into the Supreme Court's opinion in Allentown Mack. 6
The D.C. Circuit's approach to the polling standard controversy
in Allentown Mack reflects that court's dislike of the Board's unitary
standard. The court was critical of the Board's decision to apply the
same standard to polling that it applies to RM elections and employer
withdrawals of recognition and suggested that a tripartite standard
might be the best approach?27  Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit
declined, unlike other circuits, to translate its policy preferences into
220. See id- at 1062.
221. Ld- at 1060.
222. See itL at 1062.
223. Id. at 1063.
224. See iL
225. See id.
226. The Allentown Mack Court agreed that polling is potentially less dangerous to the
employer-employee relationship than abrupt withdrawals of recognition. See Allentown
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,365 (1998).
227. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1487 (D.C. Cir.
1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). The majority reasoned that, since the Board maintains
that elections are the preferred method of testing union support, the standard for RM
elections should be less demanding than that for polling. See id. Likewise, the lack of
procedural safeguards governing employer withdrawals of recognition led the court to
hold that the standard for such withdrawals should be more demanding than that for
polling. See id.
1999] 1951
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a lower polling standard.m
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit took the other circuits to task for
lowering the standard. 9 It questioned the assumption entertained by
the other courts that the polling standard must do more than make
polling "only marginally useful to employers. ' '23 Since the NLRA
contains no provision specifically governing polling and because
polling can disrupt and unsettle the workplace, the Board is free to
restrict the use of polling as it sees fit.?' Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
reasoned, the other courts should have deferred to the Board's
expertise in labor matters and left the polling standard intact. 2 The
court further criticized the other circuits for the means they used to
accomplish their objective of making the polling standard lower than
the standard for employer withdrawals of recognition.233  While it
might be true that the polling standard should be lower than the
standard for withdrawing recognition, it does not follow that the
polling standard should be lowered.23 Instead, the court suggested
that its fellow circuits accomplish their objective by raising the
standard for employer withdrawals of recognition.235
The Supreme Court's opinion in Allentown Mack evinces the
kind of blatant judicial policymaking of which the D.C. Circuit
complained, though the Court's holding that the unitary standard is
not irrational initially masks its overreaching. This first holding
conforms to the APA's deference requirement. As Texas
Petrochemicals,"36  shows, the standard is based on policy
considerations that can hardly be labeled irrational. The Board
228. Judge Sentelle dissented from the majority in Allentown Mack. See id. at 1489
(Sentelle, J., dissenting). Characterizing the Board's polling standard as an example of a
law "divorced from logic and from the common sense of people who live under it," he
decried the majority's acceptance of the Board's polling standard. Id. at 1489-90 (Sentelle,
J., dissenting). The Board's application of its polling standard in Allentown Mack, he
noted, resulted in the union's continued representation of the very employees that had
rejected it 19 to 13 in the employer's poll. See id. at 1489 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge
Sentelle agreed with the other circuits that the Board's polling standard renders polling
meaningless and after locating "no suggestion of unfairness" in the record and
"overwhelming objective evidence" of the union's loss of majority support, he concluded
that the Board reached the wrong decision in Allentown Mack. Id. at 1489-91 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
229. See id. at 1486-87.
230. Id at 1486.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1487.
233. See id
234. See id
235. See id
236. 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989).
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offered several justifications for the unitary standard in that case.
The Board argued that polls, like RM elections and withdrawals of
recognition, present "a challenge to the union in its role as
representative." 27 Moreover, all three activities are "unsettling to the
employees involved."'2 8 The Board also cited the nature of polls as a
reason for the unitary standard: polls are essentially employer-
initiated and controlled.139 Additionally, the NLRB does not directly
supervise polls like it does RM elections.240 This distinction is
important because employers often conduct polls in bad faith.241
Although the immediate effects of polling might be less cataclysmic
than those of RM elections, the polling standard should remain at
least as demanding as the standard for elections because of the real
threat that employers will abuse polls.242 Whatever the merit of the
individual reasons proffered by the Board for the unitary standard,
the standard appears on balance to be neither capricious nor
arbitrary. Consequently, the Court's conclusion that it was bound
under the APA to apply the unitary standard to the facts of the case
seems correct.243
The mirage of deference that the Court's first holding creates
evaporates when the Court substitutes its interpretation of the
objective reasonable doubt standard for that of the Board's. Perhaps
more disturbing than the Court's decision to replace the Board's
interpretation with its own is the authority the Court cited as the basis
for its interpretation-the dictionary.244  Accusing the Board of
"linguistic revisionism," the Court replaced a "[k]ey [word] of a
technical sort,"245 developed by an agency with a specialized
knowledge of labor relations, with an ordinary jury standard.2' The
237. lId at 1062.
238. Id
239. See id
240. See id at 1061.
241. See Flynn, supra note 187, at 667 (noting that "the reporters are replete with cases
in which the polling employer's sincerity and good faith are in very short supply").
Interestingly, the employer's behavior in NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981), the first case at the circuit level to replace the Board's
objective reasonable doubt standard with the substantial, objective evidence test, provides
a prime example of such bad faith. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text
(discussing A.W. Thompson).
242. See Flynn, supra note 187, at 667.
243. See 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A) (1994); Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 364.
244. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 367.
245. Id at 390 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. The Court's reliance on dictionary definitions in Allentown Mack represents a
variation of the "hypertextualism" documented by Professor Pierce. See Pierce, supra
note 3, at 749-52. Hypertextualism is an extreme version of textualism (that is, the use of
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Court's position amounts to a challenge to the Board's authority to
give content to its rules in the course of deciding cases. Yet the
judiciary has engaged in this very practice for centuries. One has but
to browse through Black's Law Dictionary to find evidence that
words often attain a legal significance that goes far beyond their
literal meanings.247 A court articulates a rule. The contours of the
rule are indefinite. Over time, the courts fill in these contours by
applying the rule to the facts of particular cases 48 In Allentown
Mack, the Court seems to object to its own time-honored practice and
to imply that the Board may announce rules by adjudication but may
not interpret them through adjudication. This argument ignores that,
if adjudication involves anything, it involves the interpretation of the
dictionary definitions, rules of grammar, and canons of construction to derive the objective
meaning of statutory words or phrases) that the Court has employed in recent years to
dilute Chevron deference by invalidating agency interpretations of statutes at Chevron's
first-step. See id. Hypertextualism occurs when a court invalidates an agency's statutory
interpretation based on linguistic precision that does not really exist, or when a court,
relying exclusively on the abstract meaning of a particular word or phrase, invalidates an
agency interpretation even though other evidence strongly suggests that the legislature
intended a meaning inconsistent with that which the court assigns. See id. at 752.
The Court's decision to replace the Board's unitary standard in Allentown Mack is an
example of the latter type of hypertextualism applied in a Seminole Rock context. The
Court was correct that doubt is better defined as uncertainty rather than disbelief. See
CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 414 (1995) (defining "doubt" as
"uncertainty about something, esp. about how good or true it is"); 1 JOHNSON'S
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1819) (defining "doubt" as "1. Uncertainty
of mind; suspense; undetermined state of opinion.... 2. Question; point unsettled.... 3.
Scruple; perplexity; irresolution.... 4. Uncertainty of condition.... 5. Suspicion;
apprehension of ill.... 6. Difficulty objected"); THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY
983 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "doubt" as "l.a. The (subjective) state of uncertainty with
regard to the truth or reality of anything; undecidedness of belief or opinion.... b. The
condition of being uncertain.... 2. A matter or point involved in uncertainty; a doubtful
question; a difficulty.... 3.a. Apprehension, dread, fear.... b. A thing to be dreaded;
danger, risk"). By lowering the Board's unitary standard solely on the "abstract meaning"
of doubt, however, the Court ignored the policy considerations (such as the tendency of
employers to conduct polls in bad faith) that led the Board to permit polling only in the
limited instances where employers could satisfy its more rigorous standard.
247. Take, for example, the word "consideration." Most people would not define it as
"[t]he inducement to a contract .... Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one
party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or
undertaken by the other." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 306 (6th ed. 1990). While courts
assign this definition as the meaning of "consideration," the AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1982) defines it as "1. Careful thought; deliberation. 2. A factor to
be considered in forming a judgment or decision. 3. Thoughtful concern for others;
solicitude. 4. A thought produced by considering .... 5. ... [R]ecompense. 6. Law.
Something promised, given, or done that has the effect of making an agreement a legally
enforceable contract. 7. High regard."
248. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 100-03 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., Little Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) (discussing the development of
negligence principles in toit law).
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rule pertinent to the case before the adjudicating body.
It might be argued that the Court's position amounts simply to a
"plain statement" requirement. This argument is unsatisfactory given
the Court's approach to the unitary standard. First, the Board's case
law established clearly that the unitary standard was more demanding
than the jury trial reasonable doubt standard. 49 Neither the Court
nor Allentown Mack disputed this assessment. True, the Board's
interpretation of the unitary standard failed to tell employers exactly
what they had to prove to satisfy it; however, this lack of precision is
common to almost all legal rules. Consider the jury trial reasonable
doubt standard, for instance. Case law implies that its meaning is not
as clear-cut as the Court has suggested.Y° Certainly the standard
cannot be understood fully by looking up "reasonable" and "doubt"
in an ordinary dictionary. Moreover, by basing its decision on
semantics alone, the Court ignored completely the policies behind the
Board's interpretation of the unitary standard. As Texas
Petrochemicals shows, the Board's more demanding interpretation is
grounded in policy considerations like stability in the workplace? 15
249. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
250. Judicial attempts to define reasonable doubt are notable for their inadequacy.
Perhaps the most famous attempt to define reasonable doubt is contained in the
Massachussetts case, Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 5 (Cush.) 295 (1850):
Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably pretty well
understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because every
thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possibile or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
Id at 320; see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 8, 52 n.59 (1972) (noting this passage as the "most famous definition" of
reasonable doubt). The evidentiary value of this definition is, to put it mildly,
questionable. What, for instance, is a "moral certainty"?
Problems with defining reasonable doubt have led the Fourth Circuit to hold that
district courts need not attempt to define the phrase when issuing instructions to the jury.
See United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[E]fforts to define
reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept .... "); United States
v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This circuit has repeatedly warned against
giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly
lessen the burden of proof."). This problem remains true even where the jury requests
such a definition. As the court noted in United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir. 1994):
If there is a definition that can clarify the meaning of reasonable doubt, common
sense suggests that such a definition be offered to all juries, even those that do
not venture a request. But until we find a definition that so captures the meaning
of "reasonable doubt" that we would mandate its use in all criminal trials in this
circuit, we cannot hold that it is error to refuse to give some definition.
a d at 46.
251. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1062 (1989); supra notes 214-
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The Court's approach undermines those considerations, and, in so
doing, illustrates the dangers of divorcing text from context.
Whatever the wisdom of the Court's methodology, the Court's
authority to rewrite the Board's standard is fairly doubtful. The
Seminole Rock principle as expressed in Thomas Jefferson required
the Court to defer substantially to the Board's interpretation of the
reasonable doubt standard unless the Board's interpretation was
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the rule.52  The Court's
determination in Allentown Mack that the Board's interpretation was
inconsistent with the rule is premised on the Board's inability to give
content to its rules through the adjudicatory process and unsupported
by the policy reasons that the Board has given as the rationale for its
interpretation153
The Court's application of its reformulated standard to the facts
of Allentown Mack raises additional issues. Although it declared that
the Board could "forthrightly and explicitly" adopt evidentiary
presumptions,254 the Court proceeded to ignore two such rules in its
evaluation of the evidence.25 In one breath the Court both upheld
the Board's authority to enact evidentiary presumptions and
disregarded those presumptions germane to the case before it.
Because Congress charged the Board, not the courts, with developing
and applying the national labor policy, the Court's actions seem
inappropriate.2s6 The courts' experiences with labor disputes are
extremely limited. Of the cases filed with the NLRB, only one
percent makes it to federal court.2 7 The relatively limited experience
that the federal courts have with labor issues argues strongly against
judicial policymaking in this area. The Allentown Mack Court would
have done well to remember Justice Frankfurter's counsel that
administrative law is "law in the making" and that the courts should
be "wary against the danger of premature synthesis.""2
26 and accompanying text.
252. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,512 (1994).
253. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 372. The consistency with which the Board has
applied its good faith, reasonable doubt standard over the years probably means that its
application of the standard in Allentown Mack was neither arbitrary nor capricious under
the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
254. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378.
255. See id. at 390-97 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. See supra notes 103-10,164-73 and accompanying text.
257. See Flynn, supra note 187, at 658 & n.17.
258. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614, 619
(1927); see also Alfred S. Neely, Justice Frankfurter, Universal Camera, and a
Jurisprudence of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1994)
(supporting Justice Frankfurter's restrained approach to the review of administrative
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To the extent that Allentown Mack might signal an era of more
stringent judicial scrutiny of Board actions, undesirable consequences
could result. The most obvious consequence is that labor law cases
will take up a larger share of the judiciary's limited resources. Less
obvious is that more stringent review of Board actions is unlikely to
encourage the Board to make its rules more explicit. Ironically, the
Court's treatment of the Board's unitary standard in Allentown Mack
illustrates precisely why the Board is sometimes less than explicit in
modifying preexisting rules: The federal courts' tend to substitute
their views for those of the Board-"deference be damned."' 9 This
tendency to make, rather than simply review, labor policy means that
more stringent judicial review of Board actions will only increase the
Board's reluctance to formulate clear policies26 and discourage the
promulgation of unambiguous rules 6' The early indicators from the
circuit courts are that Allentown Mack will lead to more rigorous
judicial review of NLRB actions.262
agency decisions).
259. Flynn, supra note 16, at 433. As Professor Flynn explains:
The rulemaking agencies' treatment at the hands of the federal courts is hardly
encouraging. To the contrary, their experience suggests that when presented
with a clear policy "target," the courts are all too prone to substitute their views
for those of the agency-deference be damned. A central problem is that
doctrines of judicial review of agency action are extremely malleable; as with the
canons of statutory construction, judges can generally find one that gets them
where they want to go. The combination of the courts' tendency toward
overreaching and these varied and flexible doctrines is so lethal ... that whether
the agency's policy stands or falls often turns on little more than the circuit
panel's ideological bias.
Id. at 433-34 (footnotes omitted); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 485 (1985) (asserting
that the federal appellate courts frequently engage in judicial policymaking under the
guise of statutory interpretation).
260. See Krent, supra note 5, at 1230 (arguing that increased judicial review of
administrative actions could result in fewer and more discretionary rules).
261. See id. at 1213-14 (contending that agencies are sensitive to judicial review and
that increased judicial review will discourage agencies from promulgating rules).
262. See Matthews Readymix, Inc., v. NLRB, No. 97-1696, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
1159, at *8-*9 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29,1999); Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638,
643 (6th Cir. 1998). At issue in Mid-America was whether licensed practical nurses
("LPNs") employed by the nursing home were supervisors and therefore not covered by
the NLRA. See Mid-America, 148 F.3d at 639. Though the LPNs performed a variety of
supervisory functions, the Board found that these activities were strictly regulated by
employer policy. See id. at 643. Relying on its rule that the mere performance of
supervisory activities strictly regulated by employers does not make one a supervisor, the
Board found that the LPNs were not supervisors within the meaning of the Act. See id.
Conceding that the NLRB's rule is entitled to deference, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless
vacated the Board's decision. See id. The court listed several supervisory activities that
the LPNs performed without strict employer regulation, including evaluating nursing
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Overly stringent judicial review could impinge greatly on the
Board's ability to adapt its rules to changing circumstances-to
exercise the very expertise that entitles its decisions to deference 63
Such judicially mandated inflexibility could make it more difficult for
the Board to provide guidance to the ALJs charged with resolving the
myriad and complex labor problems presented them.264 Thus, the
cumulative effect of Allentown Mack might well be to increase, rather
than decrease, the uncertainties in labor policy.
Regardless of its other effects, Allentown Mack's most immediate
impact is to lower the standard that employers must satisfy before
they may petition successfully for RM elections or unilaterally
withdraw recognition from unions. Allentown Mack thus threatens to
disrupt labor relations across the country. The Board, realizing the
gravity of the situation, appears poised to overturn Celanese Corp. of
America,2 65 the decision giving employers the right to unilaterally
withdraw union recognition.26 6 Employers would then be left with
RM elections as the only way they can attempt to rid themselves of
unions.2 67
Allentown Mack represents a deviation from the Supreme
assistants and recommending their retention or discharge. See id. The court concluded
that, by holding that the LPNs were not supervisors, the Board had effectively but not
explicitly modified its policy regarding supervisory activities in violation of Allentown
Mack. See id.
The D.C. Circuit in Matthews Readymix declined to enforce a Board order after
holding that the Board had incorrectly found the employer guilty of an unfair labor
practice. See Matthews Readymix, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1159, at "1-*2. There, an
employer unilaterally withdrew recognition of the 42-member striking union after all but
one of the 52 replacement employees signed a petition to decertify the union. See id. at
*2-*4. The Board held the employer's withdrawal constituted an unfair labor practice
because 34 of the replacement employees had filled out personnel forms during the hiring
process that asked them whether they were union members. See id. at *6-*7. Citing
Allentown Mack's admonition that the Board must "'draw all those inferences that the
evidence fairly demands,'" the court accused the Board of ignoring evidence that tended
to show that the personnel form did not amount to coercive interrogation. Id. at *9-*11
(quoting Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378). The evidence detailed by the court included
the fact that the personnel form requested many pieces of personal information and that
testimony that the employees initially hid their petition from management. See id. at "11-
*13.
263. See Krent, supra note 5, at 1222 (arguing that "[a]ny judicial doctrine that forces
agencies to follow preexisting doctrines has the potential cost of stymieing agency ability
to address problems based on contemporary technological, political, and economic
realities").
264. See id.
265. 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
266. See id. at 671; Susan J. McGorlick, Labor Attorneys Address Allentown Mack,
Possibility NLRB Will Overrule Celanese, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at Cl (Aug. 5,1998).
267. See id.
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Court's tradition of deference to Board decisions. The Court ignored
the dictates of the APA and its own precedent when it rewrote the
Board's polling standard. In so doing, the Court substituted its own
policy preferences for those of the NLRB even though, like all the
federal courts, it is poorly equipped to address labor law's highly
complex issues.268 The Court revealed this inability in Allentown
Mack by reaching a conclusion that is likely to produce, rather than
reduce, uncertainties in our national labor policy. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the Allentown Mack Court should have
heeded Curtin Matheson's admonition to refrain from substituting
Board policies with those that the Justices "would have formulated
had [they] sat on the Board."269
CURTIS H. ALLEN III
268. Indeed, Congress was motivated in part to pass the NLRA because "tihe case law
demonstrated that the courts were not institutionally capable of formulating or
implementing a workable labor policy." 1 HARDIN, supra note 103, at 3. The judiciary
proved inadequate for several reasons. First, the multitudinous conflicts between labor
and management resulting from the combinations of labor and capital brought about by
the Industrial Revolution "called for broad legislative solutions." 1 Id at 4. Second, those
remedies that the judiciary did attempt to fashion for labor disputes proved "too inflexible
... to effectuate whatever substantive standards the courts announced." 1 Id.
269. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (citing Charles
D. Bonnanno Linen Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,413,418 (1982)).
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